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I. Introduction
In this article, we analyze antitrust policy in Mexico. We discuss the economic prin-
ciples of Mexican antitrust law, their legal underpinnings, and the nature and extent
of enforcement activities. We compare each of these aspects of Mexican antitrust law
with the United States. We find that while the economic principles and the structure
of antitrust law itself are very similar between the two countries, the extent to which
antitrust law is enforced is very different, primarily because of differences in the maturity
of the two legal and regulatory systems and in the political and public consensus for
the benefits of competition. We also discuss the evolving nature of antitrust policy in
both countries and some possible directions for the development of Mexican antitrust
policy in the future. Section 2 analyzes the main elements of Mexican antitrust law and
compares them with the United States. Section 3 discusses the enforcement of antitrust
law in the two countries. The final section discusses recent modifications and additions
to U.S. antitrust law and likely future directions of antitrust law in Mexico.
Professor Daniel J. Slottje, Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, Dallas,
Texas; Stephen D. Prowse, KPMG, LLP, Dallas, Texas. The opinions expressed herein do not
necessarily reflect the views of KPMG, LLP. We are grateful to Ulrich Brunnhuber, Jennifer
Johnson, and Tania Fabiani for able research assistance. The usual caveats hold.
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II. Antitrust Policy in Mexico
A. BACKGROUND
Antitrust policy in Mexico, at least on paper, has a much longer history than in the
United States. While U.S. antitrust policy can be traced from the end of the nineteenth
century, the Mexican Constitution of 1857 explicitly prohibited monopolies and all prac-
tices or measures by companies that affected free participation in the market. According
to Van Fleet, the Mexican Constitution represented the western hemisphere's first written
prohibition of monopolies.' This was primarily a politically motivated response to the
practices of the previous ruling Spanish empire in Mexico that encouraged monopolies
in order to favor Spanish-based companies over Mexican firms.
Mexican law has, at regular intervals since 1857, reiterated the prohibition of monop-
olies and restraints of trade. The 1917 Mexican Constitution, the 1934 Monopolies Law,
and the 1950 Law on Economic Powers of the Federal Executive all contained such lan-
guage. However, it has not been until the last ten years that the spirit of such laws has
been enforced or implemented to any degree at all. Indeed, much Mexican economic
policy over this period has been characterized by price controls, control over entry into
industries, protection of large politically influential business groups or cartels from com-
petition, establishment of state-owned monopolies, import protection, and strong state
supervision. Ironically, the 1934 Monopolies Law was actually used by the Mexican gov-
ernment to fix official prices for specified products.2
By the mid-1980s, as growth in the Mexican economy slowed and the country
faced a number of financial and economic crises, it became clear that traditional Mexi-
can economic policies, including its competition policy, were no longer viable. Mexican
economic policy thus changed direction and adopted an explicit new aim of replac-
ing government control with market competition. This manifested itself in a number
of specific policy changes. First, the government ended most domestic price controls
and reduced constraints on new entry. The government also eliminated most compul-
sory import licenses, reduced tariffs, and entered into NAFTA. Second, the government
also privatized many state enterprises to increase the potentiai for market-based disci-
pline. Public firms in the telephone industry, commercial banking, steel, sugar, airlines,
railroads, and television broadcasting were privatized in the early 1990s. Finally, a new
general competition law was introduced in 1993, when Mexico adopted the Federal Law
of Economic Competition (LFCE) and created the Federal Competition Commission
(CFC) to enforce it. The LFCE is the current governing law on Mexican antitrust and
competition policy. It replaced wholesale the existing competition law and its introduc-
tion was accompanied by a new and much more serious intent to actively enforce it than
had existed previously.
The evolution of U.S. antitrust law contrasts sharply with that of Mexico. United
States antitrust law is rooted in the 1887 Interstate Commerce Act and the 1890 Sherman
Act, which created federal powers and institutions to combat monopolies and monopolis-
tic practices. Since the late nineteenth century numerous other laws relating to perceived
anti-competitive activities have been passed, including the 1936 Robinson-Patman Act
1. See Allan Van Fleet, Competition Policy in a Developing Economy: Mexico's Federal Economic
Competition Law, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV. (Apr./May 1998).
2. Id.
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(regarding price discrimination) and the 1914 Clayton Act, the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Act,
and the 1976 Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (all regarding mergers). Over time, the interpreta-
tion of the content and meaning of such laws by the regulatory agencies and, ultimately,
the courts has evolved as the U.S. economy and the collective understanding of the eco-
nomics of competition has evolved. Current U.S. antitrust policy thus rests on a body of
sometimes very old law that has a rich history-over 100 years-of evolving interpreta-
tions and enforcement. The actual application of Mexican antitrust law, in contrast, is
in much more of an infant stage than U.S. law.
III. Main Elements of Mexican Antitrust Law
The LFCE adopted many of the most advanced ideas and practices from around the
world with regard to antitrust policy and was heavily influenced by substantial consul-
tations with economists and other countries' antitrust agencies. 3 It was also influenced
heavily by a requirement of the NAFTA agreement that mandated that Canadian, Mexi-
can, and U.S. competition policies should "proscribe anti-competitive business conduct."4
As such, it is no surprise that the economic principles underlying Mexican antitrust law
and the structure of antitrust law itself in Mexico are very similar to U.S. laws.
Mexican antitrust law is actually the product of three distinct documents.5 First, the
Constitution, in article 28, bans monopoly and monopolistic practices. Second, the LFCE
is the formal implementation of article 28 and is aimed at preventing and penalizing anti-
competitive conduct and mergers. Third, regulations to implement the LFCE, published
in March 1998, develop specific aspects of the law.6 We now outline the main elements
of Mexican antitrust law and compare them to the United States. We focus on five
main elements or characteristics of antitrust law: the degree to which the focus is on
the competitive process versus competitors, the treatment of different types of trade
practices, enforcement mechanisms, merger law, and the nature of the exemptions and
exclusions from antitrust law in both countries.
A. Focus ON THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS VERSUS COMPETITORS
A main element of Mexican antitrust law is its focus on the competitive process,
not on the competitors themselves.7 Thus, while on paper monopoly is prohibited in
the Constitution, in practice the LFCE has no separate sections addressing monopolists.
Rather, it focuses on assessing a company's actions as either pro- or anti-competitive.
3. Michael 0. Wise, Review of Competition Law and Policy in Mexico, OECD J. COMPETITION L.
& PoL'y 1:4, at 43 (1999).
4. See Article 1501 of the NAFTA text cited in Caludia Griera Hernindez, Competition Poli-
cies in Mexico, 1 MEX. & WORLD WEBIOURNAL 1 (1996), available at http://www.isop.ucla.
edu/profmex/webjournal.htm.
5. Wise, supra note 3.
6. In addition, provisions of other regulatory laws often refer to the LFCE, the CFC, and their
powers.
7. See Wise, supra note 3; see also James E. Crawford, The Harmonization of Law and Mexican
Antitrust: Cooperation or Resistance?, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 407 (1997).
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The LFCE does not, in practice, penalize companies for being monopolists or even acting
like monopolists by charging high prices or restricting output. Rather, what is prohibited
is conduct that by excluding other competitors achieves or maintains monopoly. For
example, the LFCE does not address abusive high pricing in and of itself. Violations are
instead defined in terms of exclusionary practices that hurt competitors. The economic
principle behind this distinction is that if a firm attempts to charge super-competitive
prices, such conduct will normally invite new competitors to enter the market, and is
thus self-correcting. Only if the firm tries to enhance or maintain its market power by
engaging in activities that exclude competitors will the Mexican antitrust authorities step
in and initiate corrective action.
Such a focus is taken directly from U.S. antitrust law. In the United States, the
Sherman Act does not prohibit monopoly, charging high prices, or restricting output.
The focus is on prohibiting exclusionary practices, as exemplified in Justice Stevens'
comments on U.S. antitrust policy in National Society of Professional Engineers vs. United
States, where he said that "it focuses directly on the challenged restraint's impacts on
competitive conditions."
B. "ABSOLUTE" VERSUS "RELATIVE" EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES
A second main element of Mexican antitrust law is the classification of exclusionary
practices into two distinct categories: first, those practices that are per se illegal, and sec-
ond, those that are illegal only if the parties have substantial power in a defined relevant
market.9 For example, chapter 2, article 9 of the LFCE refers to "absolute monopo-
listic practices," which are prohibited per se. Parties to these practices cannot defend
them by claiming they are efficient or have no effect on the degree of competition in
a market. Mexican antitrust law presumes an anti-competitive effect of such practices
conclusively. Parties found guilty of such "absolute" practices are subject to adminis-
trative sanctions under the LFCE. In addition, the CFC may report associated criminal
cJoniUaLL Lo LI Jubli. PrLcutrl. S LLL ouUL.t¥edL¢ L pr Jracties p " 7y iclude h nt-a
agreements between firms, including price-fixing, output restriction, market division,
and bid rigging.
In contrast, "relative monopolistic practices" as defined by the LFCE (chapter 2,
article 10) may be found illegal only subject to a more fact-sensitive inquiry on the
part of those passing judgment. A "relative" monopolistic practice only violates Mexican
antitrust law if two conditions are satisfied. First, the purpose or effect of the restraint
must be to "unfairly drive other economic agents from the market, substantially impede
their access to the market, or establish exclusive advantages in favor of. 10 a firm. Sec-
ond, the practice must be undertaken by a firm having "substantial power in the relevant
market"'" In contrast to "absolute" practices, parties to "relative" practices can offer a
defense on the grounds of efficiency for which the burden of proof lies on the presumed
8. See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'r v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
9. See Wise, supra note 3.
10. Joshua A. Newberg, Mexico's New Economic Competition Law: Toward the Development of a
Mexican Law of Antitrust, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 587, 592-93 (1994).
11. Id.
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responsible parties. Sanctions for "relative" practices are also generally less severe than
for "absolute" practices, and are limited to civil remedies. Relative practices include hor-
izontal agreements not specifically identified as "absolute" violations, including collusive
boycotts, and all forms of vertical agreements, including exclusive dealing, tied sales and
resale price maintenance.
The Mexican distinction between "absolute" and "relative" restraints of trade is, of
course, extremely similar to the U.S. distinction between per se illegal acts, and those acts
that are illegal only if found to violate the "rule of reason." In addition, the criteria used
to decide whether a "relative" act is in violation of Mexican antitrust law is extremely
similar to that expressed in the United States for the "rule of reason" in Continental
TV, Inc. vs. GTE Sylvania, Inc., where "the fact finder weighs all of the circumstances
of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an
unreasonable restraint on competition."12 Thus, the weighing of the factual circumstances
and the analysis of the market players' relative power resulting from the restraint are
characteristics of both countries' antitrust law when considering trade practices classified
as "relative" (in Mexico) or subject to the "rule of reason" (in the United States).
There are also similarities between the types of restraint classified as per se illegal
versus those subject to a more fact-sensitive inquiry. Like the United States, Mexico treats
most forms of horizontal agreements as per se illegal, including price-fixing, market
division, output restriction, and bid rigging. Both countries also treat most forms of
vertical agreements as subject to consideration of the costs and benefits of the act. This
approach is generally consistent with economic principles. Mexico, however, has a more
economically logical characterization of activities in that it classifies all kinds of vertical
agreements as "relative" practices, whereas in the United States, some vertical agreements,
such as resale price maintenance are treated in the law as per se violations. Certain tying
agreements are also classified in U.S. law as per se violations. However, these are primarily
differences in form as opposed to substance. Despite the per se label, prohibitions against




Mexican antitrust law, as expressed in the LFCE, provides for both a centralized
federal enforcement agency and for the ability of a party to bring a private action.14
Centralized federal enforcement in Mexico is handled by the CFC, which is an admin-
istrative body given the task of investigating and combating monopolistic practices. The
CFC has the power to investigate antitrust violations either in response to a complaint
or on its own initiative, bring action, and sanction offenders. Sanctions may take the
form of fines or the suspension or correction of the forbidden practice, including the
dismantling of mergers. The CFC also offers (nonbinding) advisory opinions to parties
12. Ruth Buchanan, Border Crossings: NAFTA, Regulatory Restructuring, and the Politics of Place,
2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 371, 377 (1995).
13. Michael 0. Wise, Review of United States Competition Law and Policy: Role of Competition
Policy in Regulatory Reform, OECD J. COMPETITION L. & Po'v 1:1, at 3 (1999), available at
http://www1.oecd.org/daf/clp/Country-reviews/regrefusa.pdf.
14. Wise, supra note 3.
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who have queries regarding the legality of their own business practices. The CFC consists
of five presidential-appointed commissioners (three economists and two lawyers) and
has a staff of about 100, including thirty economists and thirty lawyers.
Private actions are also possible under Mexican antitrust law. Article 38 of the LFCE
authorizes private parties to take action against antitrust violators. However, this right is
very circumscribed. Rights of private action are limited to a claim for double damages,
but only after the CFC has found a violation. Indeed, since the passing of the LFCE in
1993, private actions have almost never been used by third parties to address antitrust
violations.5
Enforcement provisions written into Mexican law look quite similar to those of the
United States. In the United States, enforcement is at three levels: federal enforcement,
state enforcement, and private action. 6 Of these, federal enforcement and private action
are quantifiably the most active. The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) are the two agencies in federal antitrust enforcement, which have the
ability to investigate, bring action, levy sanctions, and give general guidelines. The struc-
ture of the Mexican CFC looks extremely similar to the FTC in the United States-the
FTC has five presidential appointees and has a large staff of lawyers and economists.
Private actions are possible under U.S. antitrust law. The Clayton Act gives private
parties the ability to bring actions against antitrust violators. It allows private parties to
recover triple damages in such actions. United States law in this respect gives more rights
to private parties than Mexican law. In addition, the maturity and sophistication of the
U.S. legal system and the strength of the plaintiffs' bar effectively means that private
actions are much more frequently used in the United States than in Mexico. The ultimate
effect of the frequent use of private antitrust suits in the United States is somewhat
unclear; private suits can, however, in theory, supplement government enforcement. In
the United States, the litigants' priorities and motivations are not always consistent with
the regulatory agencies' views on competition policy.
D. MERGER LAW
Merger law in the United States and Mexico is also very similar. In Mexico, mergers
whose structure or effect is to reduce, distort, or hinder competition are prohibited. Pre-
merger notification is required for mergers above a specified size.17 The LFCE mandates
that in analyzing proposed mergers the CFC should consider relevant factors such as
whether the merging parties would obtain the power to fix prices, restrict competitors'
access to the market, or restrict output in the relevant market, and whether actual
or potential competitors likely would inhibit such power. LFCE regulations explicitly
provide for an efficiency defense for mergers, assigning the burden of proof to the
merging parties.
In addition, the LFCE details the criteria to be used to define the relevant market
and to determine the existence of market power. To determine the relevant market, the
LFCE mandates consideration of a number of factors. The most important of these
15. id.
16. Wise, supra note 13.
17. 12 million times the minimum general wage.
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is the existence of close substitutes for the good or service being provided, including
consideration of technological possibilities, what consumers consider to be substitutes,
the costs of moving substitute goods to the relevant market, the costs of buyers attaining
access to other markets, and the existence of barriers to alternative sources of supply or
providers' access to other suppliers. 1" To determine the existence of market power, the
LFCE mandates consideration of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI)-that is, the
sum of the squared market shares of all the firms in the market. Mexican regulations set
out a "safe harbor" for mergers that raise the HHI by less than seventy five points or that
result in an HHI of less than 2000. The CFC also applies the Index of Domination (ID),
developed by Mexican economists on the CFC. The ID is the square of each company's
market share divided by the HHI, summed across all companies in the market. 9 These
indicators are not determinative but are merely guidelines: the CFC will also examine
other factors that are relevant to determining whether a prospective merger would lead
to a substantial increase in market power for the merging parties, such as the existence
of barriers to entry into the market, companies' access to inputs and the merging parties'
recent conduct.
Even if a merger results in substantial market power, the CFC can consider efficiency
gains from the merger and whether they offset the potential anticompetitive effects. If
they do, the merger will not be challenged.
Remedies for mergers in Mexico with anti-competitive aspects can be either correc-
tive or preventive. Preventive remedies consist of obligations to notify regulators about
future planned mergers, the elimination of exclusivity clauses or commitment to facili-
tate competitors' entry. In the extreme the CFC is empowered to halt proposed mergers.
Corrective remedies require the divestiture of certain assets.
In the United States, combinations of all kinds are covered by the general merger
statute, the Clayton Act (1914), and subsequent modifications to it contained in the
Celler-Kefauver Act (1950), and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (1976). There is a pre-merger
notification requirement for proposed mergers above a certain size. The legal test applied
is whether the transaction is likely to harm competition or tend to create monopoly.
The agencies' guidelines outline a market definition protocol, specify how to identify and
characterize market participants and set standards for evaluating the likely competitive
effects of entry. The guidelines include market share tests, and using the HHI index
to identify thresholds above which anti-competitive effects of mergers should generate
heightened concern. In the United States, the regulatory agencies consider a market with
an HHI below 1,000 to be unconcentrated and unlikely to be subject to any adverse
competitive effects. A market with an HHI between 1,000 and 1,800 is considered to
be moderately concentrated. Markets with an HHI above 1,800 are considered to be
highly concentrated. Mergers that result in an increase in the HHI of less than 100
points in moderately concentrated post-merger markets are viewed as unlikely to have
adverse competitive consequences. Mergers producing an increase in the HHI of greater
18. Allan Van Fleet, Consolidation con Salsa: Mergers and Acquisitions in Mexico, 15 ANTITRUST
13 (2001).
19. The purpose of the ID is to give greater weight to especially high market shares of dominant
firms in Mexico's concentrated private sector. The CFC will be unlikely to challenge mergers
that result in the ID deceasing or resulting in an ID of less than 2500. See id.
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than fifty points in highly concentrated post-merger markets are viewed as potentially
raising competitive concerns, depending on other factors such as entry conditions and
efficiencies.
20
In the United States, remedies for mergers identified as being anticompetitive include
prohibiting proposed mergers or attaching specific conditions to them, such as the
divestiture of certain assets.
Merger policy as it is written into law appears very similar between Mexico and the
United States. As with merger analysis in the United States, the assessment of mergers
in Mexico is concerned primarily with horizontal effects. Vertical mergers are generally
viewed as efficiency enhancing. In addition, the Mexican approach to defining the rel-
evant market and assessing market power is based expressly on those principles set out
in the U.S. Merger Guidelines.
E. EXEMPTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS FROM ANTITRUST LAW
Both U.S. and Mexican antitrust law offer exceptions, exemptions, and special treat-
ments for particular activities or sectors. Some of these exceptions are similar and some
are different. In Mexico, some of the activities excluded from antitrust law are similar
to those excluded in most countries (including the United States), such as legally consti-
tuted labor associations and copyright and patent holders.2 1 In addition, certain strategic
sectors are also effectively exempted to a large extent. These include the postal service,
telegraph, petroleum, basic petrochemicals, nuclear energy, and electricity industries. For
several of these sectors, independent regulatory agencies have been established and are
responsible for ensuring firms in these sectors do not abuse their market power. Public
sector agencies are not exempt from the LFCE.
In the United States, the list of exempt sectors is somewhat smaller. In addition,
for sectors where antitrust policy is diluted, competition policy is implemented through
special rules or enforcement structures. Such sectors include energy, trucking, and the
OpU LU IJILiU Li y. %_11 llfl[d)I u11MII.C WIL IVICAIL 1 11 1 1L UIC ILCU dWLiC3,
public sector firms are exempt from antitrust law.
22
IV. Enforcement Activities in Mexico and the United States
While the economic and legal principles that lie behind antitrust law in Mexico and
the United States are very similar, there appear to be greater differences between the two
countries in terms of the degree to which the written law is actually enforced. Here, the
United States appears to be the more active and consistent enforcer.
In particular, a number of commentators on Mexican economic policy have criti-
cized the CFC for being ineffective. Some have gone so far as to claim that the CFC
20. See U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, U.S. Horizontal Merger
Guidelines (Apr. 2, 1992, revised Apr. 8, 1997), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 5 13,104,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm.
21. Wise, supra note 3.
22. Wise, supra note 13.
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has served, in most instances, to legalize monopoly and monopolistic practices. 3 This
has been the result it is argued, of political pressures on the CFC from powerful interest
groups who benefited from the cartelization of the Mexican economy prior to 1993.
Critics of the CFC have focused on a number of high profile mergers that the CFC
approved that appeared to raise some antitrust issues-the acquisition of Cablevision, a
large television company, by Telmex (the Mexican telephone monopoly) was one such
merger; the merger of two large radio transmitters (Radio Red and Radio Center) was
another.
24
Impressions of more active enforcement in the United States are borne out by com-
paring the number of antitrust actions taken by the regulatory bodies in both countries.
In 1999, for example, according to filings with the OECD, the CFC decided on 245
proposed mergers. The CFC took action in nine of these cases (3.6 percent), imposing
conditions on six proposed mergers, and blocking three. In the United States, the FTC
and the DOJ together investigated 520 proposed mergers, and took action in seventy-
six of these cases (14.6 percent), either resulting in changes to the proposed merger to
meet regulators' objections, or to the abandonment of the proposed merger entirely.
Nonmerger enforcement activity tells a similar story. In Mexico, the CFC investigated
forty two cases of alleged monopolistic practices in 1999. Of these, the CFC imposed
penalties in nine cases (21 percent). In the United States, the DOJ alone opened 293
investigations into anticompetitive activity, and filed antitrust actions or civil complaints
against companies in ninety-three of them (31 percent). (This does not consider state
regulatory actions or private actions in response to alleged anticompetitive practices.)
There are many reasons to believe that Mexican antitrust law is not enforced as
actively or consistently as U.S. law. First, the Mexican regulatory authorities have much
fewer resources to call on than do U.S. regulators: the CFC has a staff of roughly 160
employees, whereas the FTC and DOJ combined have a staff of over 1800. This excludes
those resources in the United States at the state level used to enforce state antitrust law
and the wealth of resources at the plaintiffs' bar that can be used to bring private actions
in the United States. This disparity in resources is arguably in direct contrast to the rela-
tive need for antitrust enforcement in the two countries. The U.S. economy, after all, has
operated in a fairly effectively enforced antitrust environment for decades. In contrast,
the Mexican economy until 1993 operated in an environment where cartels were actively
encouraged. Thus, the existing level of corporate concentration in Mexico is much higher
than in the United States. In 1992, for example, the twenty-five largest Mexican com-
panies accounted for almost half of Mexico's GDP. Cemex, the large Mexican cement
company, accounted for over 60 percent of the domestic Mexican cement market, and
the three largest Mexican banks accounted for almost 75 percent of total funds in the
Mexican banking system." These are much higher concentration levels than exist in the
United States. This level of concentration in so many industries suggests that there may
be a greater need for antitrust enforcement in Mexico than the United States, although
concentration is, of course, only one indication of potential antitrust issues.
23. See G. Aguilar, El Deficil Art de Legitimar Monompolios, EL FINANCIERO 35 (1995); Herndndez,
supra note 4.
24. See Hern6.ndez, supra note 4.
25. See Newberg, supra note 10, at 603.
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Second, and probably most important, is the weaker public acceptance and political
will in Mexico behind the idea that there are large social benefits from competition. In
the United States, there is a longstanding and widely held belief in the benefits of compe-
tition, consistent with the deeply rooted emphasis on individualism and entrepreneurial
initiative. In contrast, the Mexican commitment to competition is only a recent phe-
nomenon. The political will and public acceptance of the social benefits of such a com-
mitment are not nearly as strong as in the United States, and the regulatory bodies
charged with enforcing antitrust policy must act within the political and social con-
straints that this imposes on them. Thus, while the powers given the CFC look adequate
enough on paper to enforce antitrust law effectively, it is too early to tell whether the
political consensus behind competition will be strong enough to allow the written law
to be enforced appropriately.
V. The Dynamic Nature of Antitrust Policy
and Directions for the Future
As stated earlier, antitrust policy in the United States has evolved as the interpreta-
tion of the meaning and content of the various antitrust acts has changed in response
to the changing nature of the U.S. economy, the increasing influence of economics on
antitrust policy, and the changing understanding of the economics of competition. The
increasing influence of economics on antitrust policy can be dated from the FTC Act
of 1914, which established the FTC and had the aim of bringing economic expertise
to the application of general competition and antitrust law. Since then, the influence
of economists on antitrust policy in the United States has continued to grow, with
economists holding high positions both at the FTC and the Antitrust Department of
the Department of Justice, and both agencies' staffs consisting of a large number of
economists.
The inflipncp nf Pcnnnrnicq nn nntltrilt lJiw in the United Stite' k' imnnrtAnt
because as different economic principles have gained ascendancy, the way in which
antitrust law has been applied has generally followed. For example, in the middle of the
twentieth century, when economic theory considered the degree of concentration in a
market to be very significant and often even determinative of market power (regardless
of entry conditions or other factors), so did antitrust policy. As that view has changed, so
has the interpretation and application of antitrust policy by the regulatory authorities.2 6
That evolution continues today, primarily sparked by large-scale changes in the
U.S. economy. The increasing globalization of markets, rapid technological progress,
and other changes in the U.S. economy, have also resulted in new or changing inter-
pretations of U.S. antitrust policy. For example, in 1995, new antitrust guidelines for
companies' international operations were issued by the FTC and Department of Jus-
tice in response to the increasing number of firms involved in international business.
27
26. Wise, supra note 13.
27. See U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Enforcement Guide-
lines for International Operations (Apr. 5, 1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/guidelines/internat.ht m.
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In addition, new guidelines have also been issued regarding the licensing of Intellec-
tual Property in response to the growing importance of patents, copyrights, and trade
secrets as corporate assets.28 Finally, new guidelines have recently been issued to address
the increasing number and sophistication of affiliations between firms (joint ventures,
strategic alliances, etc.) that have become an important new way for companies to take
advantage of research and development of new products.29
This recent evolution of U.S. antitrust policy provides some clues as to the issues
Mexican antitrust policy will have to address as Mexico's economy continues to develop
and its antitrust authority becomes more sophisticated and mature. Issues such as intel-
lectual property, the increasing complexity of affiliations between firms, and the increas-
ing importance of firm's international operations will all be issues that the CFC will have
to address in terms of how it enforces Mexican antitrust law.
28. See U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for
the Licensing of Intellectual Property (Apr. 6, 1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/guidelines/ipguide.htm.
29. See U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for
Collaborations Among Competitors (Apr. 7, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/
04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf.

